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We study strategies with one-period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral 
bargaining games. A strategy has one-period recall if actions in a particular period are only 
conditioned on information in the previous and the current period. We show that if players 
are suﬃciently patient, given any proposal in the space of possible agreements, there exists 
a subgame perfect equilibrium such that the given proposal is made and unanimously 
accepted in period zero. As a corollary we derive that also perpetual delay can be sustained 
as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Our strategies are pure and have one-period recall, and 
we do not make use of a public randomization device. The players’ discount factors are 
allowed to be heterogeneous. We also construct a ﬁnite automata representation of our 
strategy proﬁle.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of the most important problems in economic theory is the bargaining problem. The bargaining problem studies how 
agents make an agreement when they can achieve a particular set of feasible payoffs by collaborating. A bargaining game 
consists of a sequence of proposals and responses to the proposals. If a proposal is accepted by all the players, the game 
ends. If a proposal is rejected by at least one player, the game continues and the next proposal is made.
We provide a folk theorem for a general class of multilateral bargaining games. The main result of the paper is that 
any feasible payoff vector can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome using strategies with one-period 
recall, provided that the players are suﬃciently patient. A strategy proﬁle is said to have one-period recall if the players’ 
actions in any given round of bargaining may only be conditioned on actions in the previous and the current rounds. The 
constructed strategy proﬁle is pure and we do not rely on a public randomization device to establish our folk theorem. As 
a corollary we derive that also perpetual delay can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome using strategies 
with one-period recall. We allow the players to have heterogeneous discount factors.
Folk theorems constitute a class of theorems which state that any individually rational outcome can be sustained as an 
equilibrium. Early contributions to the folk theorem literature are by Friedman (1971) and by Rubinstein (1979). Fudenberg 
and Maskin (1986) have proved a folk theorem in repeated games with discounting, where subgame perfect equilibrium is 
used as the solution concept. Since bargaining games do not belong to the class of repeated games, they are not covered by 
these results.
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A crucial assumption in both contributions is that of irreducibility: starting from any given state, any other state is visited 
with a positive probability, irrespective of the moves of any particular player. In bargaining games, some of the states are 
terminal, and the irreducibility condition is clearly violated. Moreover, both Dutta (1995) and Fudenberg and Yamamoto
(2011) assume the set of states and the set of actions to be ﬁnite, whereas a large part of the bargaining literature studies 
inﬁnite action sets. The existing folk theorems for repeated games and for stochastic games therefore do not cover the 
bargaining model.
One of the main results in the ﬁeld of bargaining has been proved in Rubinstein (1982). Rubinstein (1982) studies 
two-person alternating offers bargaining and shows that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in this model. In the 
unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the proposal of the ﬁrst proposer is immediately accepted by his opponent. The folk 
theorem does evidently not hold for two-player bargaining games. We therefore study bargaining games with at least three 
players in this paper.
The proof of Rubinstein (1982) does not work for bargaining problems with more than two players. As reported in 
Binmore et al. (1992), one of the ﬁrst extensions to the three-person case was made by Shaked. In Shaked’s example, 
Player 1 starts by making a proposal which describes each player’s share of a unit surplus. The other players must accept 
or reject this proposal sequentially. If the proposal is accepted by all players, it is implemented and the game ends. If the 
proposal is rejected by one of the players, the next period begins and Player 2 makes a new proposal. Negotiation continues 
in this way. It is shown that any eﬃcient payoff vector can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium if the common 
discount factor is suﬃciently high.
Herrero (1985) obtains a result similar to Shaked for the case with three or more players, though we will explain that 
the construction used in Herrero (1985) is not complete. Haller (1986) also considers the case with three or more players 
in a game where players vote simultaneously on a proposal. Haller (1986) shows that any eﬃcient division of a unit surplus 
can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium irrespective of the value of the discount factor. While these papers 
have identiﬁed that the driving force for the multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs is that a responder can be compensated by 
rejecting a deviating offer, the extent of such multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs in a general setting and the key factors that 
drive such multiplicity are less clear. It is here that our paper contributes.
All constructions used in the literature so far rely on strategies which require inﬁnite recall for all players. The action 
of a player in a given time-period depends on the whole history of play. In particular, the strategy of every player at any 
given time-period depends on the actual play in period zero. Inﬁnite recall allows for the punishment of a player, who 
has deviated from his strategy only once, during the whole remainder of the game. Several authors have questioned the 
plausibility of such behavior.
Aumann (1981) discusses some of the options to narrow down the deﬁnition of equilibrium to avoid unreasonable 
predictions and mentions bounded recall as a way of modeling bounded rationality in repeated games. Sabourian (1998)
characterizes the set of bounded recall pure subgame perfect equilibria in a repeated game setting without discounting. 
His results indicate that the equilibrium set expends fast in the length of recall. Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) show in a 
repeated game context with imperfect public monitoring that for some parameter settings the assumption of bounded recall 
may reduce the set of equilibrium payoffs to a singleton. To obtain such a result, however, they also make strong symmetry 
assumptions with respect to the strategies under consideration. Bhaskar et al. (2013) study subgame perfect equilibria in 
stochastic games that are puriﬁable and have bounded recall. Equilibrium strategies are puriﬁable if they also constitute an 
equilibrium of a perturbed game with independent private payoff perturbations in the sense of Harsanyi (1973). They show 
that only Markovian equilibria have bounded recall and are puriﬁable. Barlo et al. (2009) prove that the folk theorem in 
repeated games continues to hold even if one restricts attention to strategies with one-period recall.
We consider a general speciﬁcation of the multilateral bargaining model and explore the existence of subgame perfect 
equilibria under the strong bounded recall restriction that players’ actions may only be conditional on actions in the previous 
and the current period. Our bargaining protocol covers many existing models as special cases. At the beginning of each 
round of bargaining, nature chooses the proposer and the order of responses as summarized by a permutation of the set of 
players. We do not place any restrictions on the moves by nature. These moves could be random and depend on the entire 
history of play. In particular, the bargaining protocol is allowed to have inﬁnite recall. We make only weak assumptions on 
the set of feasible payoffs and allow for sets that are non-convex or discrete.
Special cases of our bargaining protocol with alternating or rotating proposers are described in Rubinstein (1982) and 
Herrero (1985). We cover protocols with time-invariant recognition probabilities as studied in Binmore (1987) and Banks 
and Duggan (2000). Models where the proposer is selected by means of an underlying Markov process generalize these 
approaches, see Merlo and Wilson (1995), Kalandrakis (2006), and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010), and are also special 
cases of our bargaining protocol. Part of the literature studies endogenous bargaining protocols, where a player who rejects 
becomes the next proposer, a bargaining protocol introduced in Selten (1981) and also used in Chatterjee et al. (1993) in 
coalitional bargaining theory. Our set-up allows for endogenous protocols as well, where not only rejections affect the choice 
of the next proposer, but also the contents of previous proposals may inﬂuence this choice, something which is not covered 
in the bargaining literature so far.
We allow for heterogeneous discount factors. Unlike the classical folk theorem in Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), where 
players have identical discount factors, Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) ﬁnd that in two-player repeated games with heteroge-
neous discount factors, not all feasible individually rational payoffs can be supported by an equilibrium, even when both 
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repeated game. Chen (2008) shows the possibility of a player obtaining a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff below his 
effective minimax value in a three-player repeated game. As our main result demonstrates, no such diﬃculties arise for mul-
tilateral bargaining games with heterogeneous discount factors. We show that any feasible payoff vector can be sustained as 
a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome using strategies with one-period recall, provided that the players’ discount factors 
exceed a certain threshold. The threshold is independent of the payoff vector in question. It is completely characterized by 
the set of feasible payoffs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our class of multilateral bargaining games and 
we describe how existing models ﬁt into it. In Section 3 we analyze the results of Herrero (1985). We show that these 
results rely on the use of strategies with inﬁnite recall. In Section 4 we present a motivating example, which illustrates how 
a payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in one-period recall strategies. In Section 5 we prove 
the main result, the folk theorem for a general class of multilateral bargaining games. We also construct subgame perfect 
equilibrium strategies with one-period recall that lead to perpetual disagreement. In Section 6 we describe the strategies 
constructed for the proof of the folk theorem by means of a ﬁnite automaton. Section 7 concludes.
2. Bargaining games
We consider a dynamic game of perfect information , where a set N of players with cardinality n ≥ 3 has to agree on 
the choice of a payoff vector in a set of feasible payoffs V . We use the notation e0 for the vector (0, . . . , 0), and ei for the 
i-th unit vector in RN . We make four assumptions on the set of feasible payoffs V :
1. V is a closed subset of RN+ .
2. ∀v ∈ V , ∀i ∈ N , vi ≤ 1.
3. e0 ∈ V , ∀i ∈ N , ei ∈ V .
4. ∀v ∈ V , the set {i ∈ N | vi = 1} contains at most one point.
These four assumptions are satisﬁed in most applications and are not very restrictive. Closedness is a standard technical 
assumption. The second assumption is just a normalization of the set V . Any bounded set of feasible payoffs satisﬁes this 
assumption after an appropriate linear transformation of the payoffs. The ﬁrst and second assumption together plus the 
standard assumption that the bargaining problem is essential implies that we can assume without loss of generality that for 
every i ∈ N there is some v ∈ V such that vi = 1. Together with the standard requirement that V is comprehensive from 
below, this would imply the third assumption. The last assumption says that it is not possible for two players to reach their 
maximum utility level simultaneously. This assumption would be satisﬁed if players can make some transfers to each other. 
Notice that our assumptions permit the set V to be non-convex or to be discrete.
The set of permutations from {1, . . . , n} into N is denoted by . In each time period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , nature selects the 
proposer and the order of responders by means of a permutation π t ∈ . The numbers {1, . . . , n} are the positions of the 
players in the bargaining protocol. Player π t(1) makes a proposal xt ∈ V , after which Player π t(2) responds to the proposal 
by accepting or rejecting it. If Player π t(2) accepts, it is Player π t(3)’s turn to respond to the proposal and so on. If all 
players accept the proposal, the game ends and the proposal is implemented. If one of the players rejects the proposal, 
the next period begins. In the next time period nature again selects a permutation, which determines the proposer and the 
order of the players to respond to the proposal. The utility of Player i ∈ N who receives outcome xi in period t is δti xi , where 
δi ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor for Player i. The utility of perpetual disagreement is 0 for all players.
Our bargaining protocol is very general. There are no restrictions on the process by which the permutation is selected 
in each round. The permutation is therefore selected in each round by means of a probability distribution over the set 
of all permutations which may depend on the entire history of play. We explain next how the protocols as described in 
Selten (1981), Herrero (1985), Binmore (1987), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Merlo and Wilson (1995), Banks and Duggan (2000), 
Kalandrakis (2006), and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010) follow as special cases.
In Selten (1981) and Chatterjee et al. (1993) there is an endogenous protocol for the players: the player who rejects is 
the next proposer. In this case the permutation in each period depends on the history of play in the previous period. Herrero
(1985) considers a model with players that rotate in making offers. In our model, this is achieved by specifying π t (k) =
t + k mod n. In Binmore (1987) and Banks and Duggan (2000) the proposer selection process is modeled by time-invariant 
recognition probabilities. The probability that Player i ∈ N is recognized to make a proposal is constant across all periods. In 
Merlo and Wilson (1995), Kalandrakis (2006), and Herings and Predtetchinski (2010), the order in which players act in any 
period is determined by a Markov process: if the state of the game is s, then the game moves to state s′ with probability 
p(s, s′). In other words, the current state depends on the previous state and actions of the players do not inﬂuence the 
state, a speciﬁcation that is allowed for in our model. Our bargaining protocol even allows for the next proposer to depend 
on the current proposal, or on proposals made in the past, something which is not covered in the bargaining literature so 
far.
A history h is a sequence of actions that have occurred before a particular decision node in the game. There are three 
different types of histories. Every period there are histories ending with a move by nature, there are histories ending with 
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The bargaining protocol in Example 3.1.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 . . . t = n − 1 t = n . . .
π t(1) 1 2 3 . . . n 1 . . .
π t(2) 2 3 4 . . . 1 2 . . .
π t(3) 3 4 5 . . . 2 3 . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
π t(n − 1) n − 1 n 1 . . . n − 2 n − 1 . . .
π t(n) n 1 2 . . . n − 1 n . . .
a move by the proposer, and there are histories ending with a move by a responder. Any non-terminal history is of one of 
the following three types:
1. h ∈ Ht1 if and only if h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1, rt−1, π t),
2. h ∈ Ht2 if and only if h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1, rt−1, π t , xt),
3. h ∈ Ht3 if and only if h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1, rt−1, π t , xt , rt),
where, for k = 0, . . . , t , πk is the permutation of the set N selected by nature in period k, xk ∈ V is the proposal in period k, 
and rk ∈ N \ {πk(1)} is the player who rejected xk . After a history h ∈ Ht1 the proposer moves, after a history h ∈ Ht2 a 
responder moves, and after a history h ∈ Ht3 nature moves. In principle, one has to distinguish between histories after 
which the ﬁrst responder moves, histories after which the second responder moves, and so on. We shall not make such a 
distinction. The symbol h ∈ Ht2 might denote any of these histories. When Player π t( j) casts a vote after history h, it is to 
be understood that the Players π t(2), . . . , π t( j − 1) have already accepted the proposal. Histories in Ht1 are called proposer 
histories and those in Ht2 responder histories. We denote the union of H
t
1, H
t
2, and H
t
3 over t = 0, 1, . . . by H1, H2, and H3, 
respectively.
A strategy σi of Player i is a function that assigns a point in V to each proposer history h ∈ H1 ending with a permutation 
π t such that π t(1) = i, and an element in {accept, reject} to each responder history h ∈ H2 with the last permutation π t
being such that π t(1) = i. All our results make use of pure strategy proﬁles only.
A strategy proﬁle is denoted by σ = (σi)i∈N . Given a strategy proﬁle σ and a history h ∈ Ht1, we use pt(h) for the 
resulting proposal.
A strategy proﬁle σ is said to have the immediate acceptance property if for every t ≥ 0 and every history h ∈ Ht1, the 
proposal pt(h) is accepted by all responders. If a strategy proﬁle σ has the immediate acceptance property, then the ﬁrst 
proposal to be made is accepted, and the game ends in period 0.
A strategy σi has K-recall if it assigns the same action to Player i for all histories of the same length that coincide in the 
last K periods. More precisely, a strategy σi has K-recall if for all histories h and h¯ after which Player i moves, it holds that 
σi(h) = σi(h¯) whenever one of the following cases is true for some t = 0, 1, . . . :
1. h, ¯h ∈ Ht1, for k = t − K , . . . , t − 1: πk = π¯k , xk = x¯k , rk = r¯k , and π t = π¯ t ;
2. h, ¯h ∈ Ht2, for k = t − K , . . . , t − 1: πk = π¯k , xk = x¯k , rk = r¯k , and π t = π¯ t , xt = x¯t .
A strategy σi has inﬁnite recall if it does not have K -recall for any K .
A strategy proﬁle σ has K-recall if every strategy σi , i ∈ N , has K-recall. A strategy proﬁle σ has inﬁnite recall if it does 
not have K -recall for any K .
In this paper we use subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) as the solution concept. A strategy proﬁle is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the original game.
3. Herrero–Haller’s example
In this section we re-examine the example of an n-player divide-the-dollar game as studied in Herrero (1985). Herrero 
claims that given any division of the dollar, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium such that the given division is pro-
posed and unanimously accepted in period zero. We quote Herrero’s deﬁnition of the strategy proﬁle and argue that it is 
incomplete. We next reproduce the proof of the claim using Hans Haller’s deﬁnition of the strategy proﬁle (private commu-
nication). We show that the strategies as deﬁned by Haller have inﬁnite recall. At the end of the section we brieﬂy discuss 
Shaked’s example of multiplicity of equilibria as reported in Binmore et al. (1992).
Example 3.1. Consider a game with N = {1, . . . , n} and V = {x ∈Rn+ | x1 +· · ·+ xn ≤ 1}. The players have a common discount 
factor δ. The game proceeds as in Section 2, with the sequence of moves given by the rule displayed in Table 1.
Theorem 3.2. Consider the bargaining game of Example 3.1. If 1/(n − 1) < δ < 1, then for every proposal a ∈ V , there exists an SPE in 
which at t = 0 the proposal a is made by Player 1 and accepted by Players 2, . . . , n.
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Herrero (1985) deﬁnes the following strategy proﬁle in an attempt to prove Theorem 3.2.
1. Player 1 proposes a, which is unanimously accepted at time 0.
2. a is proposed and accepted at time t , provided a was proposed at time t − 1 (all t > 0).
3. If Player j deviates from (1) or (2) and proposes y such that yk < δ for some k = j at time τ , then
(a) Player k rejects y
(b) ek is proposed and accepted at time τ + 1
(c) ek is proposed and accepted at time t , provided ek was proposed at time t − 1 (all t > τ + 1)
(d) and, if Player l deviates from (b) or (c) to propose z with zh < δ for some h = l at time T , then begin (a) again with 
j = l and k = h.
Unfortunately, the above deﬁnition appears to be incomplete: if under item 3 there is more than one Player k = j with 
yk < δ it is not clear which one should be chosen. To illustrate this diﬃculty, consider a history where in period 0 Player 1 
proposes y = (δ, (1 − δ)/2, (1 − δ)/2) = a and Player 2 accepts. It is now Player 3’s turn to respond to the proposal. Notice 
that y2 < δ and y3 < δ. Should Player 3 accept or reject the proposal y? This question cannot be answered unless it is 
decided whether the next proposal is going to be e2 or e3 if Player 3 rejects y.
It is clear that one can interpret Conditions 1–3 in a number of ways. One such interpretation is due to Haller (private 
communication) and is reproduced below. For each t ≥ 0, for each x ∈ V , we deﬁne
it+1(x) = min{k = π t(1) | xk ≤ δ}.
This expression is well-deﬁned since we assume that δ > 1/(n − 1). We inductively deﬁne the sequence s0, s1, . . . of func-
tions, where st : V t → V with V t the t-fold product of V . We deﬁne s0 = a and
st+1(x0, . . . , xt) =
{
st(x0, . . . , xt−1), if xt = st(x0, . . . , xt−1),
eit+1(xt ), if x
t = st(x0, . . . , xt−1). (3.1)
The function st represents the “state of mind” of the players in period t and corresponds to the proposal that should be 
made in period t .
We deﬁne the strategy proﬁle σ as follows:
1. For each t ≥ 0, for each history h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1, rt−1, π t), Player π t(1) proposes pt(h) = st(x0, . . . , xt−1).
2. After history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t , xt), Player π t(k), where k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, accepts xt if [xt = st(x0, . . . , xt−1)] or [it+1(xt) =
π t() and k > ] and rejects otherwise.
The state of mind changes if the proposal is not equal to the current state of mind, irrespective of the fact whether 
the proposer demands a payoff greater or smaller than the corresponding coordinate of the current state of mind. After a 
change, the state of mind becomes the unit vector that gives a payoff of one to the responding player with the lowest index 
for whom a share less than or equal to δ was proposed. The responding players compare the proposal xt in period t to 
the state of mind st(x0, . . . , xt−1) which should have been proposed in period t . In case the actual proposal is different, all 
players reject it, except when they vote after Player it+1(xt), in which case they accept. This will ensure that the criterion 
of subgame perfection is met. If the proposal xt in period t is equal to st(x0, . . . , xt−1), then all responders accept.
In Appendix A, we give a proof of Theorem 3.2 by showing that the strategy proﬁle σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium 
provided that δ ∈ ( 1n−1 , 1).
We conclude our discussion of Herrero–Haller’s construction by showing that the strategy proﬁle σ has inﬁnite recall. 
Notice that the functions st are being determined recursively, that is st+1 is obtained as a function of st and the current 
proposal xt . We now provide suﬃcient conditions for recursively deﬁned functions to have inﬁnite recall.
Let X and Y be sets with Y ⊂ X . For each t ≥ 1, let st : Xt → Y be a function. We write s = (s0, s1, . . . ). The sequence s is 
said to have 0-recall if each st is a constant function. It is said to have k-recall for k ≥ 1 if st(x0, . . . , xt−1) = st(x¯0, . . . , ¯xt−1)
whenever t ≥ k and x = x¯ for each  ∈ {t − k, . . . , t − 1}. The sequence is said to have inﬁnite recall if it does not have 
k-recall for any k ≥ 0.
Let a be a point of Y , and, for each t ≥ 1, let f t : X × Y → Y be a function. We deﬁne the sequence s = (s0, s1, . . . ) of 
functions st : Xt → Y by induction on t as follows:
s0 = a, (3.2)
st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = f t+1(xt , st(x0, . . . , xt−1)), t ≥ 0. (3.3)
Claim 3.3. Let f = ( f 1, f 2, . . .) be a sequence of functions with, for t ≥ 1, f t : X × Y → Y and a ∈ Y be such that [1] f t(a, a) = a
for each t ≥ 1, [2] there is t ≥ 1 and x ∈ X such that f t(x, a) = a, and [3] for each t ≥ 1, for every y, y′ ∈ Y such that y = y′ , there is 
x ∈ X such that f t(x, y) = f t(x, y′). Then s as deﬁned by (3.2)–(3.3) has inﬁnite recall.
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for each t . Then by [1] each st is identically equal to a on Xt . But for t and x as in Condition [2], we have that
st(a, . . . ,a, x) = f t(x, st−1(a, . . . ,a)) = f t(x,a) = a,
leading to a contradiction.
Assume s does not have k-recall for some k ≥ 0. Then there is t ≥ k and there are points (x0, . . . , xt−1), (x¯0, . . . , ¯xt−1) ∈ Xt
such that x = x¯ for each  ∈ {t − k, . . . , t − 1}, and
st(x0, . . . , xt−1) = st(x¯0, . . . , x¯t−1).
It then follows by [3] that there is an xt ∈ X such that f t+1(xt , st(x0, . . . , xt−1)) = f t+1(xt , st(x¯0, . . . , ¯xt−1)), so
st+1(x0, . . . , xt−1, xt) = st+1(x¯0, . . . , x¯t−1, xt),
proving that s does not have k + 1-recall. 
We now use the suﬃcient conditions of Claim 3.3 to show that the Herrero–Haller strategies have inﬁnite recall.
Claim 3.4. The strategy proﬁle σ has inﬁnite recall.
Proof. We prove the claim by showing that the sequence s = (s0, s1, . . .) of states of mind as deﬁned by Equation (3.1) has 
inﬁnite recall. We take X = V and Y = {e1, . . . , en, a} and, for t = 1, . . . , n, we deﬁne the function f t : X × Y → Y by
f t(x, y) =
{
y, if x = y,
eit (x), otherwise,
where it(x) = min{k = t | xk ≤ δ}. For k ∈N and t = 1, . . . , n, we deﬁne f t+nk = f t . We verify next that the functions f t thus 
deﬁned satisfy the conditions of Claim 3.3.
Condition [1] is immediate. To verify Condition [2], we argue as follows. If a is not a member of {e1, . . . , en}, then 
f 1(e1, a) = e2 = a. If a = et for some t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, take any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {t} and notice that f t(ei, et) = eit (ei) = et because 
it(ei) = t .
To verify condition [3], consider t ≥ 1 and y, y′ ∈ Y with y = y′ . We have f t(y, y) = y and f t(y, y′) = eit (y) . Suppose 
y = eit (y) and deﬁne j = it(y). Since it(e j) = j, we have that
e j = y = eit (e j) = e j,
a contradiction. 
A well-known example of multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game is reported in 
Binmore et al. (1992, pp. 191–192), where the example is attributed to Shaked. It is argued that in a three-player divide-
the-dollar game with rotating proposers, any division of the dollar can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome. The strategies are built using states of mind similar to the functions st in Herrero–Haller’s construction. One can 
show, in much the same way as has been done above for Herrero–Haller’s construction, that the strategies given in Binmore, 
Osborne, and Rubinstein have inﬁnite recall. We refer to Herings et al. (2012), the working paper version of this paper, for 
the details.
4. Illustration of the main result
Consider a three-player bargaining game where only Player 1 can make proposals. Intuition seems to tell us that such 
a game is hardly of any interest: since Player 1 has all the bargaining power, surely the only outcome that can arise in 
this game is the one where Player 1 gets the entire surplus. We show this intuition to be wrong. In fact, there exists a 
subgame perfect equilibrium where Player 2 gets the entire surplus and one where Player 3 does. Furthermore, there is 
even a subgame perfect equilibrium where the zero vector (0, 0, 0) is proposed and accepted. Unlike the examples of the 
preceding sections, the subgame perfect equilibrium constructed below has one-period recall. To compute his proposal in a 
given period, Player 1 only has to remember his previous proposal and whether it was Player 2 or 3 who rejected it. The 
responses of Players 2 and 3 only depend on the current proposal.
While these claims are subsumed by our main theorem in the next section, we offer an explicit proof. We do so to 
illustrate the construction in the next section.
Example 4.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and V = {x ∈R3+ | x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1}. The bargaining game proceeds as described in Section 2, 
where the period t permutation π t is given by π t(i) = i for every t . So every period, Player 1 makes the proposal, after 
which Player 2 responds. If Player 2 accepts, it is Player 3’s turn to respond to the proposal. The players have a common 
discount factor δ. We deﬁne U = {e0, e2, e3}.
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such that in period 0 a is proposed by Player 1 and accepted by Players 2 and 3.
Since the permutation π t is ﬁxed throughout the game, we omit it from the notation for histories. The strategy proﬁle 
σ is deﬁned as follows.
1. At t = 0, Player 1 proposes a. For each t ≥ 1, after history h = (x0, r0, . . . , xt−1, rt−1), Player 1 proposes
pt(h) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
e0, if [xt−1 ∈ U ],
e2, if [xt−1 /∈ U and rt−1 = 2],
e3, if [xt−1 /∈ U and rt−1 = 3].
2. For t ≥ 0, after history (x0, r0, . . . , xt−1, rt−1, xt), Player 2 accepts xt if xt ∈ U , and rejects otherwise.
3. For t ≥ 0, after history (x0, r0, . . . , xt−1, rt−1, xt), Player 3 accepts xt if xt ∈ U or xt3 ≥ δ, and rejects otherwise.
According to the strategy proﬁle, the proposal a ∈ U is made and accepted in period 0. Any proposal outside U is rejected 
by Player 2, after which proposal e2 is made and accepted in the next period.
The intuition behind the strategies is the following. Player 1 is indifferent between any of his actions, because any 
proposal that Player 2 accepts gives him a payoff equal to 0. Player 2 is encouraged to accept proposals from U and to 
reject other proposals: after the rejection of a proposal that is not from U , e2 will be proposed and accepted. The same 
logic works for Player 3 except that he also accepts proposals that give him a payoff higher than or equal to δ. Notice that 
unlike the construction used in Section 3, where every responder accepts when offered a payoff greater than or equal to δ, 
it is enough to have the last responder accept when offered such a payoff.
Rubinstein (1982) has shown that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the two-player case. Our approach 
indeed breaks down for the case with two players. Subgame perfection requires the last player who responds to a proposal 
offering a payoff of at least δ to accept. In the two-player case, this enables the proposer to obtain at least a payoff of 1 − δ, 
and a contraction argument can be used to pin down equilibrium payoffs to a unique value. In cases with three or more 
players, a proposer cannot make a proposal that guarantees him a strictly positive payoff, as the proposer cannot offer more 
than δ to all the responders if δ is suﬃciently high.
Claim 4.3. The strategy proﬁle σ has the immediate acceptance property. If 1/2 < δ < 1, the strategy proﬁle σ is an SPE.
Proof. The proﬁle σ has the immediate acceptance property because Player 1 only makes proposals that belong to U and 
all members of U are accepted by Players 2 and 3. We verify that no player has a proﬁtable one-shot deviation.
Step 1. We show that Player 1 has no proﬁtable one-shot deviations. At each history h ∈ Ht1 any of Player 1’s actions 
yields Player 1 a payoff of zero. This follows because the only proposals accepted by Player 2 are e0, e2, and e3, and each 
of these proposals gives payoff 0 to Player 1. Hence Player 1 is indifferent between any of his actions. In particular, Player 1 
has no proﬁtable deviations from σ .
Step 2. We show that Players 2 and 3 have no proﬁtable one-shot deviations. Take a history h ∈ Ht2 ending with the 
proposal xt . We consider three cases:
1. xt ∈ U ,
2. xt /∈ U and xt3 < δ,
3. xt /∈ U and xt3 ≥ δ.
Case 1: xt ∈ U .
The strategy proﬁle σ calls for the acceptance of xt . If Player 2 or Player 3 deviates and rejects, the proposal e0 is made 
and accepted next period. Clearly, rejection is not a proﬁtable deviation for the responding players.
Case 2: xt /∈ U and xt3 < δ.
Consider Player 3. The strategy proﬁle σ recommends that Player 3 rejects. Rejection gives Player 3 a payoff of δt+1, 
because the proposal e3 is made and accepted in period t + 1. If Player 3 deviates and accepts the proposal, he obtains 
payoff δt xt3 < δ
t+1. So acceptance is not a proﬁtable deviation.
Consider Player 2. The strategy proﬁle σ calls for Player 2 to reject. Rejection gives Player 2 a payoff of δt+1, because the 
proposal e2 is made and accepted next period. Suppose now Player 2 deviates and accepts xt . Then Player 3 rejects xt and 
in period t + 1 the proposal e3 is made and accepted, leaving Player 2 with payoff zero. So acceptance is not a proﬁtable 
deviation for Player 2.
Case 3: xt /∈ U and xt3 ≥ δ.
Consider Player 3. According to σ , Player 3 should accept. Acceptance gives Player 3 the payoff δt xt3 ≥ δt+1. If Player 3
deviates and rejects the proposal, the proposal e3 is made and accepted in period t + 1, yielding Player 3 the payoff δt+1. 
So rejection is not a proﬁtable deviation.
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because the proposal e2 is made and accepted in period t + 1. Suppose now Player 2 deviates and accepts. Since Player 3 
accepts xt , Player 2 then receives a payoff of δt xt2. Now x
t
2 ≤ 1 − xt3 ≤ 1 − δ ≤ δ, so δt xt2 ≤ δt+1. So acceptance is not a 
proﬁtable deviation for Player 2. 
Our main result generalizes the example above in a number of ways. As has been discussed in Section 2, we allow 
nature’s choice of the permutations to be probabilistic and history dependent, where the choice of nature may even depend 
on aspects of the history of more than one period ago. Secondly, we only impose rather minimal assumptions on the set V
of feasible payoffs and we allow for heterogeneous discount factors. And ﬁnally, we show that any vector in the set V , not 
just the unit vectors, can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
5. The folk theorem for bargaining games
In this section we prove our main result: if the players are suﬃciently patient, given any point a of the set V , one 
can ﬁnd a subgame perfect equilibrium having one-period recall such that on the equilibrium path of play the point a is 
proposed and accepted in period zero. As a corollary to this result, we show that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium 
with one-period recall leading to perpetual disagreement. As a ﬁrst step, we identify the level of patience needed for the 
result to hold.
Lemma 5.1. There exists δ¯ < 1 such that for every v ∈ V the set {i ∈ N : vi ≥ δ¯} contains at most one point.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists i, j ∈ N with i = j and a sequence (vm)m∈N of points in V such that vmi ≥ 1 − 1/m
and vmj ≥ 1 − 1/m. Since the set V is compact, we can assume without loss of generality that vm converges to v¯ ∈ V . But 
then v¯ i ≥ 1 and v¯ j ≥ 1, contradicting Assumption 4. 
For the rest of this section, we ﬁx some δ¯ < 1 such that Lemma 5.1 is satisﬁed. We are now in a position to state our 
main result.
Theorem 5.2. Given any point a ∈ V there exists a strategy proﬁle σ such that:
[1] The proposal a is made in period 0 and is unanimously accepted. Furthermore, σ has the immediate acceptance property.
[2] The strategy proﬁle σ has 1-period recall.
[3] If for every i ∈ N it holds that δi ≥ δ¯, then σ is an SPE.
We deﬁne our strategy proﬁle by specifying actions for a player who is in a particular position in the game. There are n
positions in the game: the proposer, the player who responds ﬁrst, the player who responds second, and so on. The strategy 
for the proposer, π t(1), speciﬁes the proposal at each period t , as a function pt(h) of the history of play up to t . The 
strategies for “the player who responds ﬁrst”, Player π t(2), “the player who responds second”, Player π t(3), . . . , and “the 
player who responds last”, Player π t(n), specify their reaction to the proposal contingent on the history of play up to t .
We deﬁne E = {e0} ∪ {ei | i ∈ N}. We deﬁne the strategy proﬁle σ as follows:
1. In period t = 0, Player π0(1) proposes p0 = a. At t = 1, after history h = (π0, x0, r0, π1), Player π1(1) proposes
p1(h) =
{
e0, if x0 = a,
er0 , if x
0 = a.
For each t ≥ 2, after history h = (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1, rt−1, π t), Player π t(1) proposes
pt(h) =
{
e0, if xt−1 ∈ E,
ert−1 , if x
t−1 /∈ E.
2. After history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1, rt−1, π t , xt), Player π t( j), j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, accepts xt if
• [xt = pt(π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t)] or
• [t ≥ 1 and xt ∈ E and xt = eπ t (1)],
and rejects otherwise.
3. After history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1, rt−1, π t , xt), Player π t(n) accepts xt if
• [xt = pt(π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t)] or
• [t ≥ 1 and xt ∈ E and xt = eπ t (1)] or
• [xt
π t (n) ≥ δπ t (n)],
and rejects otherwise.
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which nature chooses permutations of the players. Notice that the action to be taken at a particular history of the game, as 
speciﬁed above, does not depend on how nature’s choices are generated.
Another feature of our construction is that after a given proposer history, the same proposal is to be made, irrespective 
of who the proposer is. Similarly, after any given responder history, the second responder is to respond to the proposal in 
the same way, irrespective of who the second responder is. Only the response of the last responder depends on his identity 
through the discount factor.
Our treatment of the last responder is slightly different from that of the other responders. The last responder is required 
to accept any proposal that offers him an amount at least equal to his discount factor, while this is not required for the 
other responders. This is caused by the fact that when the last responder casts his vote, he knows that all other responders 
have already accepted the proposal. Thus a yes vote by the last responder guarantees that the proposal will be implemented. 
This is not the case for the other responders.
Part [1] of Theorem 5.2 is immediate from the deﬁnition above: indeed, for every h ∈ Ht1 the proposal pt(h) is accepted 
by all the responders. In particular, the period 0 proposal p0 = a is unanimously accepted.
Part [2] is equally straightforward: Notice that every proposer history in period t ≥ 1 is of the form (h, xt−1, rt−1, π t)
where h ∈ Ht−11 is some proposer history in period t−1, while a responder history at t can be written as (h, xt−1, rt−1, π t , xt)
where h ∈ Ht−11 . It is clear from the deﬁnition above that the proposal pt(h, xt−1, rt−1, π t) at the proposal history 
(h, xt−1, rt−1, π t) does not depend on h. And hence also the response σi(h, xt−1, rt−1, π t , xt) of Player i = π t(1) at the 
responder history (h, xt−1, rt−1, π t , xt) does not depend on h. It follows that the strategy proﬁle σ has one-period recall.
We proceed to prove part [3] of the theorem. The intuition behind our construction could be summarized as follows. 
According to σ , the responders only accept a proposal pt(h) as prescribed by the strategy proﬁle σ , along with those unit 
vectors which give 0 to the proposer. This implies that any deviation by a proposer can only result in a payoff of zero, the 
essence of Claim 5.3 below. Rejections of proposals in the set E are penalized by having the next proposer offer the zero 
vector e0. Rejections of proposals outside the set E are rewarded by having the next proposer offer the maximum payoff of 
1 to the rejector.
The proof of part [3] of Theorem 5.2 is divided into three steps. Claim 5.3 shows that for each proposer history h ∈ Ht1 any 
proposal other than pt(h) yields the proposer a payoff of zero. This implies in particular that no proposer has a proﬁtable 
one-shot deviation from σ . Claim 5.4 shows that there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations from σ at the responder 
histories in period 0, and Claim 5.5 that there are no such deviations at period t ≥ 1. In Claims 5.4 and 5.5 we assume that 
for every i ∈ N , δi ≥ δ¯.
Claim 5.3. Consider a proposer history h ∈ Ht1 . If a proposal xt = pt(h) is made after history h, it leads to a payoff of 0 for the proposer. 
In particular, there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations from σ at h.
Proof. Suppose the history h ends with the permutation π t . Take any xt = pt(h). We consider two cases depending on 
whether t = 0 or t ≥ 1.
• Case t = 0. We have p0 = a. The proposal x0 = a is rejected by Player π0(2), and in period 1 the proposal eπ0(2) will be 
made and accepted, see part [1] of Theorem 5.2. This leads to payoff 0 for Player π0(1).
• Case t ≥ 1. We consider three subcases:
1. Case xt = eπ t (1) . Since xt = pt(h), the proposal xt is rejected by Player π t(2). Since the period t + 1 proposal e0 is 
accepted by part [1] of Theorem 5.2, Player π t(1) receives payoff 0.
2. Case xt ∈ E \ {eπ t (1)}. In this case the proposal xt is unanimously accepted. Player π t(1) receives payoff 0.
3. Case xt /∈ E . In this case the proposal xt is rejected by Player π t(2). The next proposal is eπ t (2) , which is accepted. 
This leads to payoff 0 for Player π t(1).
In each case Player π t(1) receives a payoff of 0. 
Claim 5.4. Consider a responder history h ∈ H02 . If, for every i ∈ N, δi ≥ δ¯, then there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations from σ at h.
Proof. Let h = (π0, x0). We consider the following three cases:
1. x0 = a,
2. x0 = a and x0
π0(n)
≥ δπ0(n) ,
3. x0 = a and x0
π0(n)
< δπ0(n) .
Case 1: x0 = a. Consider Player π0( j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. The strategy proﬁle σ prescribes that the proposal x0 be 
accepted. Suppose Player π0( j) rejects x0 instead. Then in period 1 the proposal e0 will be made and accepted. Since 0 is 
the lowest payoff in the game, rejection is not a proﬁtable deviation.
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π0(n)
≥ δπ0(n) .
Consider Player π0(n). According to σ , Player π0(n) accepts x0 and receives a payoff of x0
π0(n)
≥ δπ0(n) . If Player π0(n)
deviates and rejects, in period 1 the proposal eπ0(n) is made and accepted. It leads to a payoff of δπ0(n) for Player π
0(n), so 
the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Consider Player π0(n − 1). According to σ , Player π0(n − 1) rejects x0, the proposal eπ0(n−1) is made and accepted 
next period, and Player π0(n − 1) receives payoff δπ0(n−1) . Suppose now Player π0(n − 1) deviates and accepts x0. Since, 
according to σ , Player π0(n) accepts x0, Player π0(n − 1) receives the payoff x0
π0(n−1) . Now since x
0 belongs to V and 
x0
π0(n)
≥ δπ0(n) ≥ δ¯, we have x0π0(n−1) < δ¯ ≤ δπ0(n−1) by the choice of δ¯. So the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Consider Player π0( j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 2}. According to the strategy proﬁle σ , Player π0( j) rejects x0, and the 
proposal eπ0( j) is made and accepted next period. This leads to a payoff of δπ0( j) . Suppose now Player π
0( j) deviates and 
accepts x0. Then x0 will be rejected by Player π0( j + 1), and the proposal eπ0( j+1) is made and accepted next period. This 
leads to a payoff of zero to Player π0( j). So the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Case 3: x0 = a and x0
π0(n)
< δπ0(n) .
Consider Player π0(n). According to σ , Player π0(n) rejects x0, and the proposal eπ0(n) is made and accepted in period 1, 
leading to a payoff of δπ0(n) to Player π
0(n). If Player π0(n) deviates and accepts, he receives only x0
π0(n)
< δπ0(n) , so the 
deviation is not proﬁtable.
Consider Player π0( j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. According to σ , Player π0( j) rejects x0, and the proposal eπ0( j) is made 
and accepted in period 1, leading to a payoff of δπ0( j) for Player π
0( j). Suppose Player π0( j) deviates and accepts x0. Then 
x0 will be rejected by Player π0( j +1) and next period the proposal eπ0( j+1) will be made and accepted, thus leaving Player 
π0( j) with a payoff of 0. Thus the deviation is not proﬁtable. 
Claim 5.5. Consider a responder history h ∈ Ht2 where t ≥ 1. If, for every i ∈ N, δi ≥ δ¯, then there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations 
from σ at h.
Proof. The history h is of the form h = (h′, π t , xt) where h′ ∈ Ht−13 , π t is the permutation chosen by nature at h′ , and xt is 
the proposal chosen by Player π t(1) at (h′, π t). We consider the following cases:
1. xt ∈ E \ {eπ t (1)},
2. xt = eπ t (1) ,
3. xt /∈ E and xt
π t (n) ≥ δπ t (n) ,
4. xt /∈ E and xt
π t (n) < δπ t (n) .
Case 1: xt ∈ E \ {eπ t (1)}.
According to the strategy proﬁle σ , all the responders π t( j) for j ∈ {2, . . . , n} accept xt . In case of a rejection, next period 
the proposal e0 is made and accepted. Since 0 is the lowest possible payoff in the game, a deviation is not proﬁtable.
Case 2: xt = eπ t (1) .
Either action of Player π t( j) for j ∈ {2, . . . , n} results in a payoff of zero. Indeed, if the proposal xt is accepted, 
Player π t( j) receives xt
π t ( j) = 0. And if xt is rejected, next period the proposal will be e0, which is accepted. In either 
case Player π t( j) receives payoff 0. It follows that there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations from σ at h.
Case 3: xt /∈ E and xt
π t (n) ≥ δπ t (n) .
Notice that xt = pt(h′, π t) because for t ≥ 1 the proposal pt(h′, π t) belongs to E .
Consider Player π t(n). According to σ , Player π t(n) accepts xt and receives a payoff of δt
π t (n)x
t
π t (n) ≥ δt+1π t (n) . If Player π t(n)
deviates and rejects, in period t+1 the proposal eπ t (n) is made and accepted. This leads to a payoff of δt+1π t (n) for Player π t(n), 
so the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Consider Player π t(n − 1). According to σ , Player π t(n − 1) rejects xt , the proposal eπ t (n−1) is made and accepted next 
period, and Player π t(n − 1) receives payoff δt+1
π t (n−1) . Suppose now Player π
t(n − 1) deviates and accepts xt . Since according 
to σ , Player π t(n) accepts xt , Player π t(n − 1) then receives the payoff δt
π t (n−1)x
t
π t (n−1) . Now since x
t is a point of V and 
xt
π t (n) ≥ δπ t (n) ≥ δ¯, we have xtπ t (n−1) < δ¯ ≤ δπ t (n−1) , by the choice of δ¯. Hence δtπ t (n−1)xtπ t (n−1) < δt+1π t (n−1) and the deviation is 
not proﬁtable.
Consider Player π t( j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 2}. According to the strategy proﬁle σ , Player π t( j) rejects xt , and the 
proposal eπ t ( j) is made and accepted next period. This leads to a payoff of δ
t+1
π t ( j) . Suppose now Player π
t( j) deviates and 
accepts xt . Then xt will be rejected by Player π t( j + 1), and next period the proposal eπ t( j+1) will be made and accepted. 
This leads to a payoff of zero to Player π t( j). So the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Case 4: xt /∈ E and xt t < δπ t (n) .π (n)
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to σ , Player π t(n) rejects, and the proposal eπ t (n) is made and accepted in period t + 1, leading to a payoff of δt+1π t (n) to 
Player π t(n). If Player π t(n) deviates and accepts, he receives only a payoff of δt
π t (n)x
t
π t (n) < δ
t+1
π t (n) , so the deviation is not 
proﬁtable. Consider Player π t( j) where j ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}. According to σ , Player π t( j) rejects, and the proposal eπ t ( j) is 
made and accepted in period t + 1, leading to a payoff of δt+1
π t ( j) for Player π
t( j). Suppose Player π t( j) deviates and accepts. 
Then xt will be rejected by Player π t( j + 1) and the proposal eπ t ( j+1) will be made and accepted in period t + 1, thus 
leaving Player π t( j) with a payoff of 0. Thus the deviation is not proﬁtable. 
We derive, as a corollary to our main result, that perpetual delay can also be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome using a one-period recall strategy proﬁle.
Corollary 5.6. There exists a strategy proﬁle τ such that:
[1] On the path of play of τ , the zero vector e0 is proposed and is rejected in each round of bargaining, irrespective of the moves by 
nature. Thus τ leads to perpetual disagreement.
[2] The strategy proﬁle τ has 1-period recall.
[3] If δi ≥ δ¯ for every i ∈ N, then τ is an SPE.
The strategy proﬁle τ with the required properties is obtained by a modiﬁcation of the strategy proﬁle σ . Let σ be 
the strategy proﬁle as before with a = e0. We let τ agree with σ on all histories except possibly those responder histories 
where the responders react to the proposal e0. Under τ the proposal e0 is always to be rejected. More formally, deﬁne τ as 
follows:
1. For every proposer history h = (π0, . . . , π t), let τπ t (1)(h) = σπ t (1)(h). That is, the proposal under τ at h equals the one 
under σ .
2. Consider a responder history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt). For each responder i ∈ {π t(2), . . . , π t(n)}, let τi(h) = accept if and 
only if σi(h) = accept and xt = e0.
Part [2] of the corollary follows since σ has one-period recall.
Under the strategy proﬁle τ , the vector e0 is proposed in period t = 0. Furthermore, under the strategy proﬁle τ , the 
proposal e0 is always rejected, and, as follows by the deﬁnition of σ , the next proposal is again e0, irrespective of the 
chosen permutation. Thus, under the strategy proﬁle τ , the vector e0 is proposed and rejected in every period, leading to 
perpetual disagreement irrespective of the moves by nature. This establishes part [1] of the corollary.
Recall that under the strategy proﬁle σ , the period t = 0 proposal e0 is accepted. The next claim says that, even though 
the two strategy proﬁles might lead to different outcomes, they induce the same expected payoffs conditional on any history.
Claim 5.7. Let h ∈ H be any history. The vector of expected payoffs conditional on history h under τ equals that under σ .
Proof. First let h be a responder history such that (a) the responders have to react to the proposal e0, and (b) under the 
strategy proﬁle σ the proposal is accepted. Under the strategy proﬁle σ , the vector of expected payoffs conditional on h
is obviously the zero vector. On the other hand, under the strategy proﬁle τ the proposal e0 is rejected, and is followed 
by the proposal e0 which is again rejected, and so on. Thus the play under τ results in perpetual disagreement. Therefore, 
the vector of expected payoffs conditional on h under τ is also zero. It is now easy to see that the result is true for any 
history h. 
Now we argue that τ is robust to one-shot deviations whenever σ is. First consider responder histories where the 
responders have to react to the proposal e0. Since 0 is the lowest possible payoff in the game, it is clear that accepting e0
can never be a proﬁtable one-shot deviation. Consider any other history h. The action prescribed at h by τ is the same as 
that prescribed by σ . Claim 5.7 says that both strategy proﬁles lead to the same expected payoffs conditional on h, and it 
also implies that a one-shot deviation, say to action a, from σ at h leads to the same payoff as a one-shot deviation to a
from τ at h. We conclude that if there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations from σ , then the same is true for τ . Part [3] of 
the corollary now follows from Theorem 5.2.
6. Strategies as ﬁnite automata
In this section we construct a ﬁnite automata representation of the strategies used in the proof of Theorem 5.2. A num-
ber of different speciﬁcations of ﬁnite automata have been used in the game-theoretic literature. For a survey of this 
literature, we refer to Chatterjee and Sabourian (2009). We choose to follow the approach of Chatterjee and Sabourian
(2000) as their speciﬁcation of a machine is particularly convenient for representing strategies in a bargaining game. In
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function. An important feature of their approach is that the state of the machine does not change during a given round 
of bargaining. The output function describes the output of the machine as a function of its current state as well as the 
partial history specifying the actions taken by all the players during the current round of bargaining. A transition from one 
state to the next only occurs once a given bargaining round has been completed, i.e. once nature has chosen a permutation, 
a proposal has been made, and has been rejected. The transition function determines the next state of the machine as a 
function of its current state and the actions of all players in a given round.
Thus, a machine for Player i ∈ N is a tuple (Q i, q0i , λi, μi), where Q i is the set of states, q0i the initial state, λi the 
output function, and μi the transition function. In accordance with the convention adopted in this paper, we only have 
to consider two types of partial histories: partial histories specifying only the permutation π chosen by nature, and those 
specifying both the permutation π and the proposal x. The set of partial histories is P =  ∪ ( × V ) and the set of partial 
histories after which Player i has to move is Pi = {π ∈  | π(1) = i} ∪ {(π, x) ∈  × V | π(1) = i}. The output function λi
is a function with domain Q i × Pi mapping into the set of actions A = V ∪ {accept, reject}, where λi(qi, pi) ∈ V if pi ∈ 
and λi(qi, pi) ∈ {accept, reject} if pi ∈  × V . The outcome of any round of bargaining is speciﬁed by (π, x, r) ∈  × V × N , 
where π is the permutation chosen by nature, x is the proposal, and r is the player who rejected the proposal. The transition 
function of the machine is a function μi : Q i ×  × V × N → Q i .
Under our representation of the strategies σ1, . . . , σn , all players i ∈ N use the same set of states Q i , the same initial 
state q0i , and the same transition function μi , but possibly different output functions λi . We take Q i = {∅} ∪ E with ∅ the 
initial state. Player i’s output function λi is given as follows. Consider some π ∈ . If π(1) = i, then
λi(q,π) =
{
a, if q = ∅
q, if q ∈ E,
and if π(1) = i, then
λi(q,π, x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
accept, if [q = ∅ and x = a],
accept, if [q = ∅ and x = q],
accept, if [q = ∅ and x ∈ E and x = eπ(1)],
accept, if [xi ≥ δi and π(n) = i],
reject, otherwise.
We deﬁne the transition function μi by
μi(∅,π, x, r) =
{
e0, if x = a,
er, if x = a,
and, for each q ∈ E ,
μi(q,π, x, r) =
{
e0, if x ∈ E,
er, if x /∈ E.
Thus each strategy σi is represented by a machine with n + 2 states. One can similarly use a machine to represent the 
strategies of Section 3. In fact, one only needs n + 1 states to do so: the reason is that unlike in our construction, under the 
Haller–Herrero strategies the vector of zeroes e0 is never proposed. This illustrates that counting the length of the strategy’s 
recall and counting the number of states of its ﬁnite automaton representation lead to two different measures that capture 
different aspects of the strategy’s complexity. For a more thorough comparison of different approaches to measuring the 
complexity of a strategy, we refer to Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000, 2009).
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have proved a folk theorem for a general class of bargaining games with three or more players. We 
show that for any vector of feasible payoffs, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium such that the vector of feasible payoffs is 
proposed and accepted in period 0. The subgame perfect equilibrium involves pure strategies having one-period recall. The 
existing literature has shown such a result only for speciﬁc examples of bargaining games and relied on strategies having 
inﬁnite recall.
Our bargaining protocol is suﬃciently general to cover many bargaining protocols studied in the literature as special 
cases. Moreover, it covers cases that have not been studied in the literature so far, where for instance the protocol depends 
on proposals that have been made in previous rounds. Although our equilibrium strategies have one-period recall, the 
protocol itself is allowed to depend on aspects of the history that are related to arbitrarily many periods before. Several 
authors have studied environments where the assumption of bounded recall may severely limit the set of outcomes that 
can occur in an equilibrium. Our results show that not even one-period recall is suﬃcient to limit the set of subgame perfect 
equilibrium payoffs in multilateral bargaining games.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. It is clear that the strategy proﬁle σ as constructed in Section 3 has the immediate acceptance 
property. In particular, according to σ Player 1 proposes a in period 0, which is accepted by Players 2, . . . , n.
We show that σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium provided that δ ∈ ( 1n−1 , 1).
To do so, it suﬃces to argue that there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations from σ at any history of the game. Consider 
a non-terminal history h after which Player i moves. A one-shot deviation by Player i at history h is a strategy σ ′i for Player i
that agrees with σi on every non-terminal history except h. It is said to be proﬁtable if, conditional on the history h being 
reached, the payoff to Player i from (σ ′i , σ−i) is higher than that from σ . As our bargaining game is an inﬁnite horizon 
discounted multi-stage game with observed actions that is continuous at inﬁnity, the well known one-deviation principle 
(e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) applies.
Step 1. Consider a proposer history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1, rt−1, π t). The strategy proﬁle σ leads to a payoff of 
δt st
π t (1)(x
0, . . . , xt−1) for Player π t(1). Suppose Player π t(1) deviates from σ and proposes xt = st(x0, . . . , xt−1). Since 
it+1(xt) = π t(1), the proposal xt is rejected by Player π t(2) and next period the proposal st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = eit+1(xt ) will 
be made and accepted. This leaves Player π t(1) with a payoff of 0.
Step 2. Consider a responder history (π0, x0, r0, . . . , π t , xt) and a player j = π t(k), where k ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
Consider ﬁrst the case where xt = st(x0, . . . , xt−1). The strategy proﬁle σ prescribes acceptance and leads to a payoff of 
δt xtj for Player j. If j rejects x
t , next period the proposal st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = st(x0, . . . , xt−1) = xt will be made and accepted, 
resulting in a payoff of δt+1xtj to Player j. Hence rejection is not a proﬁtable deviation.
Consider next the case where xt = st(x0, . . . , xt−1). It follows that st+1(x0, . . . , xt) = eit+1(xt ) . Let  ∈ {1, . . . , n} be such 
that π t() = it+1(xt). We consider three cases depending on whether k < , k > , or k = .
Case 1: k < . According to σ , Player j should reject, which leads to a payoff of 0 to Player j since the rejection of xt
is followed by the proposal eit+1(xt ) , which is accepted. Suppose Player j accepts x
t . Since k + 1 ≤ , Player π t(k + 1) will 
reject xt according to σ , so also in this case the proposal eit+1(xt ) is made and accepted in the next period. We conclude 
that acceptance is not a proﬁtable deviation.
Case 2: k > . According to σ , Player j accepts, which leads to payoff δt xtj , because the players following j in the 
response order all accept xt according to σ . If j rejects xt , next period the proposal eit+1(xt ) will be made and accepted, 
leaving Player j with payoff 0. We conclude that rejection is not a proﬁtable deviation.
Case 3: k = . In this case it+1(xt) = j and the strategy proﬁle σ prescribes rejection. It leads to a payoff of δt+1 to 
Player j since following the rejection of xt the proposal eit+1(xt ) will be made and accepted in the next period. Suppose on 
the other hand that Player j accepts xt . Since the players following j in the response order all accept xt , this leads to a 
payoff of δt xtj . It follows by deﬁnition of i
t+1(xt) that xtj ≤ δ. We conclude that acceptance is not a proﬁtable deviation.
We have checked that no player has a proﬁtable one-shot deviation from σ . 
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